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 Dissolving the Iron Cages?
Tocqueville, Michels, Bureaucracy
and the Perpetuation of Elite
Power
David Courpasson
EM LYON, Ecully, France
Stewart Clegg
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
Abstract. Modern management theory often forgets more than it remem-
bers. ‘What’s new?’ is the refrain. Yet, we suggest, there is much that we
should already know from which we might appropriately learn, ‘Lest we
forget’. The current paper takes its departure from two points of remem-
brance that bear on the sustained assaults on bureaucracy that have been
unleashed by the critiques of recent years. These critiques include the
new public management literature as well as its inspiration in the new
literature of cultural entrepreneurialism. Both promise to dissolve
bureaucracy’s iron cage. We explain, using the classical political themes
of oligarchy, democracy, and the production of elite power, why we
should consider such transubstantiation alchemical by confronting con-
temporary discussions with the wisdom of an earlier, shrewder knowl-
edge, whose insights we need to recall to understand the complexity of
the hybridizations between supposedly opposite models of organiza-
tions. Key words. bureaucracy; elites; politics; power
We argue in this paper that bureaucracy, far from being superseded, is
rejuvenating, through complex processes of hybridism in which suppos-
edly opposite political structures and principles, the democratic and
oligarchic, intermingle and propagate in such a way that most criticisms
of bureaucracy are misplaced and misleading (du Gay, 2000; Courpasson
and Reed, 2004). However, what is being created is not a reproduction
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of the Weberian ideal type but a new empirical configuration, an
empirical hybridity. We suggest two complementary explanations as to
why this unexpected refurbishment of bureaucracies might be under-
way, which derive from a reading of largely forgotten and ancient
history: Michels’ Political Parties (1915) and Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America (1992/2000). Michels provides compelling hypotheses concern-
ing the complex political dynamics facilitating the perpetuation of
oligarchies, which are intricately tied up with two paradoxical demo-
cratic features of large bureaucracies: rivalries and contestations among
leaders as well as elite fragmentation and circulation (Courpasson, 2004),
while Tocqueville shows how the inherent dynamics of democracies,
transforming into monocratic regimes, in Weberian terms (1968), can turn
into mild despotic regimes.
We will address these fundamental questions by suggesting that if the
core political and moral principles of bureaucracy have not been funda-
mentally changed, we can witness a significant softening of its admin-
istrative principles and systems. This is what we call ‘soft bureaucracy’
(Courpasson, 2000). We will use the example of project management, to
suggest that this type of configuration, one of the hallmarks of entrepre-
neurial organizations, is facilitating the refurbishment of bureaucratic
systems.
Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy has, without any doubt, been identified as ‘the primary
institutional characteristic of highly complex and differentiated societies’
(Landau, 1972: 167), epitomizing ‘the modern era’ (Blau and Meyer, 1971:
10). Its greatest theorist was Max Weber (1978). Weber’s ideal type of
bureaucracy was one aspect of his overall attempt to understand the
features of Western civilization through the process of rationalization.
For Weber, rationalization simply signifies that, in principle, individuals
are increasingly likely to use calculation to master phenomena and things
through the domination of rules and instrumental systems. Weber’s
insight was that, in a social context such as an organization, the process
of bureaucratization entailed by the rationalization process results in a
diminution of freedom, initiative and individual power. People would be
expected to become machine-like obedient objects, trapped in the ‘iron
cage’. The cage is the metaphorical instrument of dominant authority
within which bureaucracy appears as a system of legitimate power ‘over’
its members, neutralizing all potential sources of countervailing power.
However, it is also clear, as Waters (1993) puts it, that if Weber was more
interested in monocratic forms of organizations, he also extensively
discussed polycratic forms, even if sometimes in an unsystematic way.
For Waters (1993), polycracy, in Weberian terms, refers to an organization
‘in which power is divided among the members on a theoretically
egalitarian basis but which is in principle capable of being aggregated in
an “upward” direction’ (Waters, 1993: 56). Weber addresses three major
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polycratic forms: collegiality (1968: 271–84), direct democracy (1968:
289–92) and representative democracy (1968: 292–99; see also Mommsen
[1974] on plebiscitarian democracy: 83–94).
In situations of bureaucratic rule, the domination of bureaucratic
leaders is fundamentally based on knowledge, which makes the ‘pro-
fessionalization of leadership thesis’ (Michels, 1915) an unexpected
bridge between democratic regimes and bureaucratic structures: ‘Bureau-
cratic domination means fundamentally domination through . . . techni-
cal knowledge . . . [and] . . . knowledge growing out of experience in the
service’ (Weber, 1968: 225). One way of reading Weber’s account of
bureaucracy is as a treatise on the formation of a particular type of moral
character bounded by an emotionally strong sense of duty as a vocation,
to which Michels counters the potential for its specialist knowledge to
create elites.
Ideal Types of Bureaucracy
Weber’s ideas about bureaucracy were transmitted through the method-
ology of ideal types. Weber’s account of bureaucracy was not a repre-
sentation for all seasons, an essential and eternal characterization of a
functionally necessary social form. As Weber conceived them, ideal types
were hypothetical, not a reference to something normatively ideal, but to
an ideational type serving as a mental model that can be widely shared
and used because analysts agree that it captures some essential features of
a phenomenon here-and-now. The ideal type does not correspond to
reality but seeks to condense essential features of it in the model so that
one can better recognize its real characteristics when it is encountered. It
is not an embodiment of one side or aspect but the synthetic ideational
representation of complex phenomena from reality.
Later, Schutz (1967) was to take issue with one aspect of Weber’s
approach to ideal types: were they a construct by the analysts or were
they the analysts’ account of the constructs in use by the members of the
research setting in question. For Schutz it was not clear whether Weber’s
ideal types, in their basis in social action, were a members’ category or
one that belonged to analysts. He thought that the construction of types
out of the concepts of everyday life should be such that they were
grounded in the members usage. However, once they were refined by an
analyst, the risk was that they became somewhat dissociated from every-
day usage. An example of how slippage could occur is evident in the
history of the concept of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy had been identified by
Weber with elite constructions of organization that were widely known
in common and shared amongst elite German echelons; these, in turn,
were subsequently taken to be the literal depiction of the phenomenon,
however and wherever it might subsequently have evolved. Thus, a
historical conception of bureaucracy, identified with top managerial
prerogative in German state organizations, defined what the bureaucracy
was taken to be. Increasingly, definition replaced Weber’s concern with
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technical rationality with the narrower conception of efficiency (Pugh,
1966). The cultural, historical, institutional, political and economic
analysis which Weber (1978) pioneered, within which his conception of
bureaucracy was embedded, was overshadowed.
Because the ideal type was a construct from a highly specific place and
time, it would have been odd for later and different realities to corre-
spond to it. Nonetheless, some sociologists made such comparisons.
When writers such as Gouldner (1954) investigated organizations, they
compared the realities they found with the type that they had inherited.
However, since the type was always an imaginary and synthetic construct
from a specific place and time this is not an immediately sensible
activity. It ends up privileging the subjectivities of those members whose
everyday usage first grounded the construct and using different circum-
stances in which other members constructed other usage as material for
constructions of other ideal types with which to question the limits of the
initial conception. The type becomes reified. It takes on a life of its own.
The analysts casting of the ideal type sets it in concrete and it is used
long past its use-by date.
Weber’s famous ideal type of bureaucracy was widely used as the basis
for case studies (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Selznick, 1949). Increasingly, it
was seen that bureaucracy could constitute a dehumanized world, a
machine destroying emotions and individualities to attain its own goals
of efficiency (Gouldner, 1955). These views were hardly novel, nor was
the most important point that Weber left out the unintended con-
sequences of the internal working of a concrete bureaucracy (Merton,
1940; Dubin, 1949; Gouldner, 1955; Crozier, 1964). Later it was both
heralded by, and seen as superseded in, taxonomic approaches to organi-
zations (Pugh and Hickson, 1976). These saw the ideal type elements
abstracted by Weber with respect to German 19th Century bureaucracy
become the definitive features of a functionalist conception of organiza-
tion structure as an essential form, determined in its particular patterns
by specific local contingencies, such as size or technology. Analysis then
became caught in a historical cul-de-sac of ever-diminishing returns as
scholars sought to defend the essentially conceived structure against all
comers (Donaldson, 1996). As Martindale (1960: 383) suggested pre-
cipiently, we should ‘compare different empirical configurations, not
empirical configurations and types’ as any specific type is always histor-
ically bounded and ‘destined to be scrapped’.
For several authors, analysing bureaucracy did not involve considera-
tion of whether or not it actually existed but only examining the concrete
conditions that might enable us to situate such and such organization
somewhere along an abstract continuum (Gouldner, 1956; Udy, 1959).
Hall’s study of the degree of bureaucratization tended to confirm that
‘bureaucracy in general may be viewed as a matter of degree, rather than
of kind’ (Hall, 1963: 37). If all efficient bureaucracies were all alike, every
inefficient bureaucracy would be inefficient in its own way, one might
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say. Bureaucracies rarely achieve efficiency in any pure state; then the
search should be for those forms of hybridity that they adopt rather than
setting up an ideal, abstracted type, as the standard measure of happiness
and then proclaiming, dolefully, on the ruination of things.
Two Criticisms of Bureaucracy
What an ideal type captures is meaning: what counts for history is
always the meaning of the people concerned in its production and
interpretation. Nonetheless, despite the existence of plenty of sound
historical advice to the contrary, the ideal type of bureaucracy has been
subject to sustained criticism. Bureaucracy, construed as an ideal type,
has been seen as the source of much of what is wrong in the contempo-
rary world. Recent history has been replete with rallying cries against
fundamental errors said to emanate from the bacillus of bureaucracy. It
is a culture that, seemingly, must be terminated with extreme prejudice.
Bureaucracy must be ‘banished’ (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997); govern-
ment must be ‘reinvented’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The reason is
simple: bureaucracy is inefficient. In the popular view, as du Gay (2000)
or Pugh (1966) point out, bureaucracy is synonymous with inefficient
business administration, pettifogging legalism, and red tape. For critics,
demolition of bureaucratic systems will further efficiency: ‘Employee
empowerment does not mean every decision in the organization must be
made democratically or through consensus’ (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997:
227). Empowerment fosters effectiveness not more egalitarian and demo-
cratic settings.
On the other hand, there are critics more enamoured of democracy than
efficiency: because the attributes of bureaucracy ‘are maladaptive when
massive change, environmental dynamism and considerable uncertainty
are the norm’ and there is a ‘growing asymmetry of power between the
managerial agents in charge of them [the mega global firms] and most
other groups in the society, including consumers, employees, and mem-
bers of the local communities in which the firms’ operations are located’
(Child and McGrath, 2001: 1136, 1140). The hierarchical configuration of
power and the multiplication of different stakeholders mean that power
and representation must be seen from different perspectives. Power
within the bureaucratic apparatus fails to reflect the representation of
interests to which it should attend.
At stake is the nature of the implicit contract between employees and
organizations. As Heckscher and Donnellon (1994) or Ashcraft (2001)
illustrate, entrepreneurial organizations try to base their efficiency and
legitimacy on a different model of commitment of organization members,
supported by a strategy of decentralization of authority, the granting of
empowerment, and the ‘substitution of normative identification with the
organization for the purely utilitarian traditional employment nexus’
(Child and McGrath 2001: 1143). The traditional bureaucratic commit-
ment ‘We will take care of you if you do what we have asked’, once
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premised on the celebrated balance of inducements and contributions
(March and Simon, 1958), seems to be a dead letter (Heckscher and
Applegate, 1994: 7). Democracy and the question of morality are relevant
to the post-bureaucratic trends they describe. The ideal type of post-
bureaucratic organization has very significant similarities to that of
democracy. Its ruling concept is that ‘everyone takes responsibility for the
success of the whole’ (Heckscher, 1994: 24). Therefore, such organiza-
tions must develop informed consensus amongst their members, rather
than relying on authority and hierarchical supervision. The development
of agreement has to be situated in interactive settings where the gathering
of information increases collective power. Politics is characterized by the
use of influence and persuasion rather than power exercised through
command and control. Trust is a crucial resource in such settings because
everyone must believe that the others are seeking mutual benefit rather
than maximizing personal gain (Heckscher, 1994: 25). Leadership is not
exercised through complex systems of rules but via guidelines for action,
which take the form of principles, ‘expressing the reasons behind the
rules’ (Heckscher, 1994: 26). Internal social processes decide who
decides, the decision-making power not being derived from official rank
but from the nature of the problems at hand. A deliberative and inter-
active structure is supposed to come from the necessary fluidity of
internal relationships. But post-bureaucracies are not communities of
friendship, but ‘networks of relationships based on specific performances
and abilities (. . .) people one can “work with” on particular projects
rather than “live with” ’ (Heckscher, 1994: 55).
In the democratic critique, the most salient implications of post-
bureaucracy are conceived as political: the relationships between indi-
vidual members, and between members and their organization, the
nature of power and authority, the conception of equity instead of
equality and, above all, the existence of flexible and permanent dialogues
concerning the rules of action. There were earlier ideal types that could
have been drawn on, such as Rothschild-Whitt and Whitt’s (1986) and
Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) collectivist organization, or Lazega’s (2000)
collegial organization, to animate the emergent models but they were
constructed in terms of mutually opposite criteria and thus were hardly
suitable for the task at hand. The task at hand, the understanding of an
emergent reality seemingly contradictory to that represented in the
classical types, requires a different kind of understanding, an under-
standing of a hybrid reality rather than an idealized essence.
Understanding Hybrids
The key bureaucratic characteristic of the new hybrid organizations is
that they retain a need for the iron fist of strong and centralized control
mechanisms, wrapped up in the velvet glove of consent. More intrusive
and intensive control techniques are replaced with legitimated general
guidelines (du Gay, 1994), which softly and progressively erode the
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autonomy of individuals, while securing their consent to new forms of
governmentality by which they increasingly regulate themselves (Pitsis
et al., 2003). As Reed puts it, ‘the delicate balance between trust and
control has moved very definitely in favour of the latter’ (Reed, 2001:
221), giving way to new forms of bureaucratic power concentrations
(Courpasson, 2006).
Several common reasons have been advanced to explain the prolifera-
tion of hybrid organizational forms; these include the necessity of adapt-
ing to changing markets and consumer tastes in favour of product
diversity, as well as the weaknesses of large-scales firms (in a very
deterministic manner) to cope with new market demands because of the
inefficiency of multiple layers of hierarchy, or their structural inertia.
Another argument is based on what Polanyi calls ‘general reciprocity’
(Powell, 1987: 83), a model of resource allocation where networks of
individuals engaged in mutually supportive actions and decisions are
crucial. Just as in the post-bureaucratic model, individuals exist above all
as embedded in networks of collaborative and reciprocal relationships,
because reputation is the most credible sign of reliability and of the
‘quality’ of trust one can put on an individual. Supervision here is not
realized through a hierarchical apparatus, but thanks to the ‘commu-
nitarian’ web of reciprocal controls that necessitates a careful reading of
the ‘weak signs’ produced in every part of the organization, which may
produce a form of social consensus between members, as a strong
substitute for formal rules and procedures, according to the advocates of
hybrid firms.
In contemporary hybrids, the promotion of socio-economic coopera-
tion is achieved through the manipulation of specific trust/control
mechanisms, thanks, above all, to the form of networks (Castells, 1996).
These hybrids evoke some types of technologies of trust, which make
politically viable a fuzzy, but nevertheless active, system of concen-
trated power. The ‘organizational hybridization’ analysed by Ferlie et al.
(1996) in the British health-care sector, demonstrates the political aspect
of the dynamics implied. Classical administrative [bureaucratic] power
is maintained, because these hybrids ‘have the technical and ideological
capacity to combine and re-combine selected elements of managerialism
with pre-existing structures of political, administrative and professional
power’ (Reed, 2001: 220). These hybrids often generate considerable
mistrust, if not downright opposition, on the part of some groups of
experts, who sense a decline in the conditions enabling the exercise of
autonomous judgement.
The question of power is therefore clearly at the core of the issue of
organizational hybridity. The post-bureaucratic hybrid is a ‘loosened
community’ (Courpasson and Dany 2003), where relationships and
groupings are temporarily maintained, where individuals’ destinies are
more and more separated, where the institutionalized dialogues and
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interactions are operated through sometimes uncertain and barely legi-
ble networks of control, of influence and of friendship. This is the very
reason why these organizational arrangements need authoritarian struc-
tures to be effective. Moreover, as Powell suggests, the pressure on
hybrid forms to perform may be intense, as the resources put into it
increase the expectation of success, and oblige business leaders to
implement tough supervisory processes. The underlying authoritarian
mechanisms continue to shape the emergence of these hybrid forms,
under the auspices of flexible structures and with the resources of
bureaucratic power systems.
A hybrid is a system of tensions between opposed goals, building
bridges between opposed sides of organizations, domination and self-
determination (Romme, 1999), in ‘the paradoxes and tensions that arise
from enacting oppositional forms’ (Ashcraft, 2001: 131). In the same vein,
Ackoff (1981, 1994, 1999) suggests a model of ‘democratic hierarchy’
aimed at improving the quality of work life, through the decentralization
of power systems and participation in decision-making processes.
Through this type of model, Ackoff considers it possible to prove that
democracy is not only [mainly] a question of feeling and of improvement
of self-determination and deliberative processes of action, but a question
of efficiency: ‘democracy and efficiency are not inimitable; in fact they
become more and more closely connected as the educational level and
economic security of the workforce (as the citizens of a country) increase’
(Ackoff, 1994: 141).
For Ackoff, a democracy in an organizational context political is a
regime based on three major features:
(1) The absence of an ultimate authority, the circularity of power; (2) the
ability of each member to participate directly or through representation in all
decisions that affect him or her directly; and (3) the ability of members,
individually or collectively, to make and implement decisions that affect no
one other than the decision-maker or decision-makers. (Ackoff, 1994: 117)
Democracy is founded on a circular form of power because ‘anyone who
has authority over others is subject to the collective authority of these
others; hence its circularity’ (Ackoff, 1994: 118). But Ackoff is also a
‘realist’ thinker. He reminds us that ‘divided labour must be coordinated
and multiple coordinators must be coordinated; therefore, where com-
plex tasks are involved, hierarchy cannot be avoided. Furthermore,
hierarchies, contrary to what many assume, need not be autocratic’
(Ackoff, 1999: 181).
Adler (2001) analyses the hybrid move as concomitant to the general
evolution of firms toward ‘trust and community systems’. He suggests
mapping institutions in a three-dimensional representation, making it
possible to consider the variety of possible organizational models
entailed by the hybridization process (Adler, 2001: 219). Hierarchy can
be combined with trust mechanisms, producing first-degree bureaucratic
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hybrids, such as ‘dynamic bureaucracy’ (Blau, 1955) or ‘enabling bureau-
cracy’ (Adler and Borys, 1996). He points out the ‘refinements of hier-
archy’ existing within business firms: the introduction of more formal
procedures (TQM, product and software development processes), the
strengthening of planning techniques (in human resource management,
in project management), of control instruments to assess the projects and
performances. Simultaneously, in a post-bureaucratic manner, he argues
that the necessary sharing of knowledge in business firms ‘depends
equally critically on a sense of shared destiny . . . a sense of mutual trust’
to improve and reinforce employee commitment. Even the form of trust
entailed by contemporary organizations is rational, according to Adler:
‘leadership seems to have shifted toward a form of trust consonant with
the ethos of “fact-based management”, independent inquiry’ (Adler,
2001: 227). He sees this shift as constituting a bureaucratic hybrid
removed from the traditional bureaucratic deference to established
authority, but which, simultaneously, relies on a rational and formalized
apparatus. The rhetoric of trust and dialogue that constitutes the post-
bureaucratic argument must not lead us simply to forget the existence of
‘façades of trust’ (Hardy et al., 1998: 71), where trust is not necessarily
undertaken ‘with reciprocity in mind and may, on the contrary, be
intended to maintain or increase power differentials’.
We argue that what these accounts of hybridity miss is that the
inherent political dynamics of organizations and of democratic regimes
lead to the unexpected reproduction of oligarchies and of the despotic
regimes which surrounds these elite circles. It should not be unexpected
that this is the case, for there are classical portents that point to the
conclusion that bureaucratic political processes lead to the reproduction
of concentrated authoritative systems. To develop this point, we suggest
that there is still much to absorb from the classics, in whom the debates
were first rehearsed, not only Weber (1978) but also even those relatively
neglected today, such as Michels’ Political Parties (1915) and Tocque-
ville’s Democracy in America (1992/2000).
Michels and Oligarchy
Michels first: the famous iron law of oligarchy states that ‘organization
gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the
mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators.
Who says organization, says oligarchy’ (Michels, 1915: 401). Michels
provides compelling arguments suggesting institutionalizing (Selznick,
1957) and circulating (Ocasio and Kim, 1999) mechanisms of power are
not exclusive but complementary dynamics within organizations. The
persistence of an oligarchic tendency in organizations results from the
circulatory trajectories of institutional oligarchs. Elite circulation is
the result of the power entrenchment of oligarchs within the restricted
boundaries of ‘inner circles’ (Useem 1984). Thus, Political Parties is one
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of the most interesting examples of the intricately tied dynamics of
oligarchy and democracy.
Two major political mechanisms enhance the perpetuation of oligar-
chies. The first is the professionalization of leadership and the parallel
‘immobility and passivity of the masses’, as well as the cultural and
educational distance between oligarchs and the governed, which is the
basic element of any centralized system of power. Thus, professional
knowledge, political skills, ‘this expert knowledge, which the leader
acquires in matters inaccessible, or almost inaccessible, to the mass, gives
him a security of tenure which conflicts with the essential principles of
democracy’ (Michels, 1915: 84). But at the same time, this distance is
maintained by the political apathy of people, who leave political ques-
tions ‘to the little group which makes a practice of attending meetings’
(Michels, 1915: 51). There is an explicit delegation of the treatment of
political questions to a minority of individuals able to bear the personal
consequences of leadership responsibilities (Michels, 1915: 60). The
‘technical indispensability’ of oligarchs is therefore strengthened by the
‘gratitude felt by the crowd for those who speak and write on their behalf’
(Michels, 1915: 60).
The second mechanism is based on a complex dialectic leading oli-
garchs to protect themselves from potential rivals and the dynamics
leading them to create willing internal elite sub-groups: the dynamics of
co-optation, of insiders’ appointments and of nominations based on value
congruity (or social similarities) are well known in the managerial
literature (Enz, 1988; Boeker, 1989; Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Kanter,
1977). According to Michels, what is important is the monitoring of
rivalries by the oligarchs themselves (Michels, 1915: 168, 170). The
tendency to counter any potential opposition is even supported by the
mass that, according to Michels, has ‘a certain natural distrust of all
newcomers’ (Michels, 1915: 170). To counter opposition, oligarchy vests
a limited amount of official power in potential rivals, including them in
the administrative apparatus through titles and responsibilities. By using
these conciliatory methods, oligarchs provide honours and rewards, and
potential rivals ‘are thus rendered innocuous’ (Michels, 1915: 176).
The result of bureaucratic-oligarchic dynamics, for Michels, is ‘not so
much a circulation des elites as a reunion des elites, an amalgam, that is
to say, of the two elements’ (Michels, 1915: 177). Nursing and educating
the potential rebels, and then, transforming them into selected aspirants
and successors give to the oligarchic elite the power to choose the future
leaders according to its own criteria and needs. Moreover, elite circula-
tion is a means of destabilizing local teams and local orderings, stimulat-
ing the need for stable and reliable central leaders. Elite unification
amalgamates with elite circulation at best: at worst, elite unification
becomes the result of a process of fragmentation of the political body,
diffusing the values and purposes of the oligarchs through their very
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opponents with whom they share a fundamental value: the desire or will
for power.
In such processes of fragmentation, traces of bureaucracy in the shape
of paradoxical centralization/decentralization dynamics can be seen. An
organization in which the elite circle is too small is more threatened by
potential rivalries. Thus, oligarchy should seek to widen its base through
the constitution of a large group of experts holding specialized knowl-
edge that help to maintain the overall legitimacy of oligarchs, both
through their presence as a group, and through the technical legitimacy
they give to the elite (Michels, 1915: 186–7). Simultaneously, by frag-
menting the elite into sub-elites, oligarchs provoke decentralizing effects
(Michels, 1915: 196–7). Oligarchy enhances decentralizing tendencies
through a fragmentation of authority, splitting up the central oligarchy
into a number of smaller oligarchies (the sub-units). But this fragmenta-
tion, as in large bureaucracies, does not modify significantly the political
structure which remains unchallenged, mainly because the critical polit-
ical issues are discussed and deliberated in the small circles of the
‘headquarters’.
Tocqueville and Democracy
In political science, Tocqueville undoubtedly remains a major reference
for thinking critically about democracy, for he wholeheartedly analysed
the most basic reasons for the weaknesses of democratic regimes. We
suggest that the adaptation of his thought to the organizational context
provides many insights. We will analyse three major Tocquevillean
insights into the functioning of democratic regimes: the question of
hierarchical relationships; the love of equality found in democratic
peoples; and the power mechanisms used in democratic regimes. An
argument about the evolution of democracies toward centralization and
despotic forms of ‘management’ will thus be suggested.
The Nature of Hierarchy in Democratic Settings
Democracy encourages pervasive feelings of equality shared by every
member of the society. In the political sphere, these are institutionalized
in periodic elections, where we get to choose which members of the
political elite will rule over us. In organizations in general, however, we
have no such choice. We are, in law, masters or servants—the very
categories that democracy was supposed to abolish. The volatility of
society and the extreme mobility of individuals give a very specific
colour to the association of servants and masters. For Tocqueville, in a
democracy, servants tend to share the ideas, feelings, virtues and vices of
all their contemporaries, ‘In democracies, not only are servants equal
among themselves; one can say that they are in a way the equals of their
masters’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 549). This is simply due to the perma-
nent and credible possibility for a servant to become a master himself.
Thus, it is just a ‘temporary and free accord of their two wills’
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(Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 549) that gives the right to someone to exercise
power over another. The temporary character of hierarchy is therefore
due to the contractual delineation of the relationship. A shared judgment
about the origin of power and obedience derives from the power of
equality. But in democracies, while servants and masters may ‘have
common occupations, they almost never have common interests’
(Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 551). Obedience is freely promised, not forced,
and it includes simply a rigorous execution of the contract, not respect,
love or devotion, as in aristocratic societies. Thus, for Tocqueville, under
democracy, hierarchy is not dismembered or destroyed. It operates in
another way, because ‘the rule is different, but there is a rule’
(Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 551). What is important, therefore, is to make a
clear distinction between the ‘aristocratic notion of subjugation’ and the
‘democratic notion of obedience’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 551). Demo-
cratic obedience entails a morality in the eyes of the one who obeys.
While it is not a ‘divine obligation’, it is not considered as degrading
because it is supposed to be chosen freely and adopted temporarily.
There is always the chance to do something else in the future, because
what is important is the individual, not the hierarchical system. Obedient
people appreciate the advantages of servitude: they are not required to
love their bosses. In a very ‘post-bureaucratic manner’, Tocqueville adds
that the servants ‘are not sure that they should not be the masters and
they are disposed to consider whoever commands them as the unjust
usurper of their right’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 553), in an argument
reminiscent of Ackoff (1999: 180).
The hierarchical relationship that derives from this conception is often
difficult, full of struggles, rivalry, and suspicion about ‘who has the right
to do what’. The boss is malevolent and mild, the subordinate malevolent
and intractable (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 553). And then, some sort of
constraining administration is likely to appear suddenly to give specific
guidelines stipulating clearly to each ‘what he is, what he can do, or what
he should do’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 553), namely, bureaucracy, under
the auspices of a powerful oligarchy.
For Tocqueville, bureaucracy solves democracy’s problem of order: it
enables power-assisted steering of the associations that form between
people in the civil and market sphere, thus holding at bay the potential
for anarchy that arises from the combination of the market and democ-
racy. Occasional sovereignty in the matter of elections and apparently
perpetual sovereignty in the matter of markets are tamed through the
everyday experience of bureaucracy.
The Power of Equality
Tocqueville’s analysis of the power of equality uncovers the reason
bureaucracy is able to reappear behind democratic settings. Paradox-
ically, the power of bureaucracies could also be due to the strength of
certain types of beliefs and feelings toward two basic principles of
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democracies: equality and freedom. According to Tocqueville, people
have ‘a much more ardent and tenacious love for equality than for
freedom’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 479). Freedom, as the result of equal-
ity, is the deepest sense of democratic ideals: ‘men will be perfectly free
because they will all be entirely equal; and they will all be perfectly equal
because they will be entirely free’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 479). The
reign of equality as a dominant fact and belief of democratic societies and
organizations is very hard to undermine, as many central features of the
organizations concerned would have to be modified: laws and rules
would have to be abolished, core ideas, goals and ends renewed, and the
habits of members changed.
The power of bureaucracies derives partly from the deeply embedded
belief that the principle of equality before the rules, the core ideal of
bureaucracy, will last forever. There is faith in its lasting stability, and in
the resulting tranquillity of people against any external and internal
changes they may observe and experience (the gratitude of the masses for
the oligarchs in Michels’ terms). In short, to quote Tocqueville once more,
the difference between freedom and equality in people’s minds is that:
from time to time, political freedom gives a certain number of citizens
sublime pleasures. Equality furnishes a multitude of little enjoyments
daily to each man. The charms of equality are felt at all moments, and they
are within the reach of all. (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 481)
Thus, the taste for equality is shared by everyone and strengthens the
cohesion of the entire community: there is no need to know the other
members individually and personally, as there is a trust in the power and
effective presence of equality. No effort is required to obtain the pleasures
brought by equality. And this is a passion at the heart of democracy, and
the major common point with some bureaucratic ideals.
For Tocqueville, the passion for equality may be a trap; one which
might lead democracies to tolerate poverty or enslavement as coexistent
with rhetorical equality. Equality and simultaneous deference to the
power of the majority may create a specific principle of obedience to the
democratic laws. Nobody can really contest the laws and rules of demo-
cratic systems, as they have, in theory, been elaborated through the will
of the people. Everyone is supposed to be an equal elector and therefore,
if someone decides to attack the rules, he must ‘either change the opinion
of the nation or ride roughshod over its will’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000:
230). Compliance to the rules is thus obtained both thanks to the political
resignation of people confronted with the power of the majority, as well
as thanks to the fact that this compliance is part of a contract viewed as a
necessary and lesser evil than disorder.
According to Tocqueville, democratic power proceeds through soft
constraints. It never uses violence and force but more sophisticated
means of attaining individual identity and the sense of being part of a
community. Escaping from democratic rules implies exclusion from a
given community, and to be progressively or suddenly isolated. The
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power that dominates operates through the self-adoration of the majority,
the ‘empire of the majority’, from which it becomes difficult to salvage
individual freedom of mind. Bureaucratic administrations protect people
from the empire that, albeit unconsciously, they help to establish, by
creating a distance between the organization and members through de-
personalizing the employment relationship.
Political Centralization and the Power of Bureaucracy
Should we admit that bureaucracy is a type of ‘administrative tyranny’,
descending into the more specific details of the execution of laws? This is
the type of criticism that has often been aimed at the administrative
centralization implied by bureaucracy. To Tocqueville, democracy com-
bined with administrative centralization and rule-based tyranny is not
acceptable because it could give way to a centralized despotic regime. Or
on the other hand, should we state with Tocqueville that the very dynamic
of democracy is to produce specific forms of despotism? If we take this
second position, we argue that bureaucracy may appear as the only
possible bulwark against the threat of tyrannical systems of government.
Tocqueville argues that under democratic regimes, the most probable
course of political evolution is towards the pre-eminence of a single
central power and uniform legislation ‘as the first condition of a good
government’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 641). The individual has far less
power than society because the system has more enlightenment than any
of the individuals who compose it. The individual appreciates being
guided by a system that shows the right course for everyone to follow.
Thus, democracy tends to evolve toward a system where a centralized
social power, unique and ubiquitous, constantly acts to create uniform
rules applicable to and acceptable by everyone. People in democracies
tend to conceive of the government ‘in the image of a lone, simple,
providential and creative power’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 642), which
brings them to accept, even request, its concentration. It is also, according
to Tocqueville, because people in democratic regimes are very active,
disseminate their efforts in multiple directions, and have no time remain-
ing for political life. Therefore, the political government and administra-
tion enlarges its sphere of action continuously: ‘a democratic government
therefore increases its prerogatives by the sole fact that it endures . . . it
becomes all the more centralized as democratic society gets older’
(Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 644).
Every central government ‘loves equality’ and ‘adores uniformity’
(Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 645), and democratic people, if they often ‘hate
the depositories of the central power (. . .) always love this power in
itself’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 644). Political centralization becomes a
necessary fact, as individual servitude tends to grow at the same time,
‘owing to ignorance’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 648). The similarities to
bureaucracy are evident and well-illustrated by the following quotation:
‘The administrative power of the state constantly spreads because no one
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but it is skilled enough to administer’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 648). It is
thus expertise that determines who governs. Centralization is also partic-
ularly rapid and uncontrollable in contexts ‘whose existence can often be
put in peril’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 649). It is not surprising that the
metaphysics of battling with uncertainty are as popular as they are with
business leaders who tend to insist so much on the dangers and external
perils surrounding the organization’s survival. It is a means for justifying
the growing prerogatives of central powers.
The disappearance of local authorities representing potential inter-
mediary powers is another reason for the growing importance of central
power. This provides an interesting analogy to the post-bureaucratic
extinction of intermediary hierarchical supervisors which, if we agree
with Tocqueville, does not give more autonomy and discretion to indi-
viduals, but rather more prerogatives to the central elites of experts and
managers (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 652–3). Consequently, administration
depends on the same power, but is also ‘compressed more and more in
the same place and is concentrated in fewer hands’ (Tocqueville,
1992/2000: 654). The progressive and political transformation of democ-
racy into oligarchy not only affects the establishment and division of
social and administrative power. To Tocqueville, it also has dramatic
consequences for the whole political regime. A certain type of oppression
threatens democratic people:
I see an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who revolve on
themselves without repose . . . Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like
a stranger to the destiny of all the others . . . he is beside them, but he does
not see them; he touches them and does not feel them . . . Above these an
immense tutelary power is elevated, which alone takes charge of assuring
their enjoyments and watching over their fate. It is absolute, detailed,
regular, far-seeing, and mild . . . the sovereign extends its arms over society
as a whole; it covers its surface with a network of small, complicated,
painstaking, uniform rules through which the most original minds and the
most vigorous souls cannot clear a way to surpass the crowd . . . it does not
destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it
hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes . . .”. (Tocqueville,
1992/2000: 663)
The quote illuminates the type of hybrids potentially resulting from some
neo-democratic forms of freedom entailed by post-bureaucratic models of
management. The co-existence of ‘mild despotism’ and ‘peaceful servi-
tude’, he suggests, ‘could be combined better than one imagines with
some of the external forms of freedom . . . established in the very shadow
of the sovereignty of the people’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 663–4).
In short, the political hybrids produced by apparently strange and
unexpected combinations of bureaucratic and democratic principles are
the direct consequence not only of the political ambivalence of systems,
but also of organizational members, who ‘feel the need to be led and the
wish to be free’ (Tocqueville, 1992/2000: 664). The accommodation of
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people to this compromise is the most probable configuration for organi-
zations to take these days. Soft bureaucracy is the figure behind this
hybrid: there are numerous bridges between administrative despotism
and the freedom of individuals to make their own way within organiza-
tions. In fact, this is perhaps the ‘least bad’ political formula for contem-
porary organizations, as it is largely preferable to either the depositing of
powers in the hands of incompetent managers, or to an apparent ‘absence
of power differentials’ which could lead to organizational anarchy gov-
erned by opaque and disordered criteria.
Let us summarize the hybridizing mechanisms unveiled by Michels
and Tocqueville in Table 1.
To have a more concrete view of some of these mechanisms, we will
now take the example of project management as a typical element of the
hybrid political dynamics leading to the perpetuation of the oligarchic
bureaucratic political structure of the organization.
Project Management: Contemporary Hybrids in Action
Recent management writers have seen project management as a circuit
breaker for bureaucracy, and have contrasted the bureaucratic past with
the future of a project-based post-modern world (Clegg, 1990). Elements
of empowerment, self-reliance, trust and peer-based teamwork controls
(Barker, 1999) are supposed to portray project-management as an explicit
and concrete appeal to post-modern/post-bureaucratic organizations. But
is post-bureaucracy post-politics? We think not. We argue in this last part
that the political dynamics suggested above apply equally to project-
management as an example of the discrepancy between managerial
innovations and the possibility of transforming the political structure of
the organization. Let us briefly examine the different dynamics.
Our first argument is that a hybrid political structure needs both elite
differentiation to ensure a credible competition among various centres of
power (individuals and/or sub-groups), and elite unification to ensure a
relative consensus on basic values and on the legitimate rules of the
internal political arena. So hybridization, in the context of business
Table 1. The perpetuation of oligarchies: comparing Michels and Tocqueville
Michels Tocqueville
• Dialectic of the elite (fragmentation–
unification)
• Nurseries of sub-oligarchies
• Destabilization of local orderings
through sub-oligarchs’ circulation
• Professionalization of leaders
• Political indifference and apathy of
the governed
• Ambivalence of democratic
hierarchies: contractual temporary
connections + the hope to become
master
• Uncertain feelings between equality
and sharp differentiation
• (Circulation of people–stability of
government)
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organizations, necessarily implies an intermediary design. It separates
elite from sub-elite members and distinguishes the former from the
necessary minimal similarity of the latter population, with regard to
values, demographic characteristics and types of aspirations.
Project management is one of the technologies used to design hybrid
political structures, for at least two major reasons. First, project manage-
ment encompasses both a principle of selection and a principle of
education. Selection mechanisms are used to enhance the circulation as
well as rivalries among sub-elite members (namely would-be project
managers and actual project managers), while facilitating the control by
incumbent oligarchs over local orderings (through appointments of new
project leaders, circulation of experts among projects, ‘go/no go’ deci-
sions at certain critical steps of the projects . . .). Education mechanisms
are used to create what Mills terms the ‘fraternity of the chosen’ (Mills,
1956). In other words, project management can be viewed as a technol-
ogy helping to create and sustain diffuse networks of acquaintanceship
between ‘professionals’, that legitimates ‘educational nurseries’ in which
project managers learn both the basics of the official body of knowledge,
as well as a feel for those underlying values whose meaning they have
to decipher (such as those values pertaining to ‘what is important to
succeed in this place’). Eventually, such learning helps the development
of ‘leadership professionalization’ in Michels’ sense. The culture of
leadership generated through project management combines Michels
and Tocqueville’s perspectives highlighted in Table 1, as the leaders
who are likely to be ‘produced’ through project management will be
individuals who:
● Understand the necessity of going beyond the standard project manage-
ment technical body of knowledge in order to be recognized as would-
be leaders
● Share a common view of the ‘politics of career’ (i.e. of the necessary
stepping stones and filters to the top)
● Aspire to common ambitions and the necessity of being ‘always’
temporarily connected to people and projects
The diffusion of a hybrid, comprising a culture of ambition and circula-
tion, sustains the stability of central governmentality. Project manage-
ment illuminates the fact that the management of sub-elite is, as Michels
put it, the central tenet of elite perpetuation. Corporate leaders have a
direct interest in shaping, grooming and educating selected aspirants,
constituting what Foucault might have called subjects with an appro-
priate comportment, etiquette, and equi to qualify as disciplined. The
question is not to know whether being a project manager constitutes a
guarantee that one will be tagged as a would-be leader. Such is obvi-
ously not the case. Being made a project manager merely hints, in a
weak sign, that oligarchs have spotted somebody and wish to test out
Dissolving the Iron Cages?
Courpasson and Clegg
335
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011org.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
certain indispensable characteristics. Mostly, these characteristics per-
tain to an ability to accept and work creatively with an existing order
and existing rules; thus, they go far beyond merely technical and
professional expertise.
The second argument relates to the features of the project management
‘profession’ itself. Wilensky’s defines (1964: 138) a profession, using two
criteria: ‘1) The job of the professional is technical-based on systematic
knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training 2)
The professional man adheres to a set of professional norms’. In our view,
project management combines ‘pure’ professional features, such as the
existence of external rules of expertise, of external associations, of official
systems of accreditation, of an official body of knowledge . . .) with
organizational kinds of norms and values. It is this, we argue, which
necessarily makes project management a professional hybrid. Project
management professionalization serves as a resource for business leaders
to compare and judge future would-be leaders, a metric for gauging the
level of ambition of pre-selected individuals. Project management thus
constitutes a springboard for those who shrewdly avoid being pegged as
‘true professionals’, with the cosmopolitan and organizationally disinter-
ested pose that this can imply. The power of organizational values, which
are epitomized by incumbent leaders, renders the distinction between
‘true professionals’ and ‘would-be oligarchs’ in terms of internal mecha-
nisms of selection and education. One should not be viewed merely as an
expert in project management if one aspires to be one of the chosen few,
but should be seen as someone equipped to move between the interest of
the project and the interests of the centre. In a very Tocquevillean
manner, the hybridization between exogenous institutions (stabilizing
the professional body) and endogenous political dynamics (enhancing
the circulation of values, the diffusion of ambitions and the creation of a
culture of precariousness among sub-elite members) is a mechanism that
helps to generate stability in the political structure.
To go a step further, still following Michels and Tocqueville’s analyses,
we argue that project management directly influences elite power struc-
tures in contemporary organizations for three major reasons. First, it
facilitates the shaping of ‘class cleavages’ inside the expert body of
project managers, between those likely to be able to aspire further and
those who have reached their personal ‘glass ceiling’. The latter will end
up either specializing in project management or going back to their initial
working environment. Project management therefore helps differentiate
some ‘chosen few’ inside a diffuse group of pre-elected individuals that
are shrewdly scattered throughout the organizational body (mostly
through the choice of project leaders and the segmentation of the internal
‘breeding ground’ of future compliant sub-oligarchs, the management and
control of key projects, and the circulation of experts and team leaders).
Second, the enactments that are project management provides business
oligarchs with arguments for ‘going over the head’ of project leaders, thus
336
Organization 13(3)
Articles
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on May 25, 2011org.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
signalling that the oligarchs are officially (bureaucratically) vested with
the power to stabilize or destabilize what project teams do, through
different kinds of decisions (such as resource allocation, project termina-
tion, team leaders demotion/promotion . . .). That they are able to do this
sometimes happens irrespective of what ‘purely’ professional criteria and
rules (as they are explicated in the official ‘bibles’ of project management)
might propose. Oligarchs dispose: they do not propose merely to follow
what the project body of knowledge legitimates. Third, project manage-
ment both creates more complex elite strata to traverse and enables a
route of social mobility within the organization. Project management is a
relatively diffused and stratified body: decisions regarding careers dis-
criminate the ‘good’ from the ‘not quite good enough’, based on the
transparency of project performance amongst the subaltern elite. Accord-
ingly, the generation of an elitist culture stems, in part, from the accep-
tance by would-be leaders of the inevitability of this fragmentation as
well as its legitimacy. As Tocqueville suggested, the core aspect of a
democratic culture might be the diffusion of a common aspiration, ‘one
day’, to become a master. Masters, in organizational terms are the
oligarchs not the project managers. It is this which is the basis of the
legitimacy of oligarchs’ choices: they engineer a kind of elitist-democratic
culture through competition in the social technologies of project manage-
ment. After all, the stability of democratic regimes is founded in part on
the quality of the elected leaders, thus on the quality of the selection and
educational processes.
Project management is a ‘classic’ hybrid: it illuminates how one might
reconcile pluralist-democratic views of elite production (anybody can
legitimately aspire to reach the circles of power) and oligarchic views
(that, in practice, only a limited proportion of people can constitute the
‘chosen few’). In the context of organizations, elite production that does
not combine the two faces of this process proves, if not impossible per
se, at least a hindrance to the understanding of the full complexity of
the hybrid. It also sheds light on a peculiar combination of collegial–
technical forms of institutionalization, through the constitution of a
well-defined body of knowledge (Hodgson, 2002), with bureaucratic-
administrative forms of control, which aims to impede the potential,
inside intermediate bodies, of ‘circles of contestation’ arising. Finally, as
Tocqueville suggested, it is the circulation of people (especially key
people), which provides the governors with the resources to stabilize
and perpetuate similar structures of power and government over time.
From the moment the circulation of sub-elite is monitored from the
centre of the organization, it is a means of, first, producing knowledge
through the diversity of individual experiences and, second, disseminat-
ing a powerful network of shared values regarding career and ambition
which also facilitate the activation and embodiment of common reference
points that structure the attention and commitment of project members.
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Such reference points include milestones, key performance indicators,
profit-margins, annual performance, respect for deadlines, respect for
budgets, deference to which is progressively internalized as incontrovert-
ible business and moral values, essential for the healthy survival of the
entire organization (Courpasson and Dany, 2003). These reference points
strengthen the regime through weaving the social fabric of allegiance for
would-be leaders.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to suggest that the added value of analysing
the political mechanism of elite perpetuation in contemporary business
firms is two-fold: first, it sheds fresh light on social-managerial technolo-
gies such as project management, highlighting their paradoxical political
influence in perpetuating and stabilizing power structures in organiza-
tions. Hitherto, these types of new ‘forms’ have mostly been praised for
their impact on the flexibility and plasticity of organizations. Second, it
helps move the study of new forms from a ‘pure’ organizational design
perspective to one that is political, demonstrating that the evolution of
organizational forms affects the stability of elite power as much as the
adaptability and performance of the firm. To put it differently, we argue
the urgency of research on the idea of ‘political performance’ (Eckstein,
1969). In the paper, we have suggested that one of the ingredients of the
political performance of business organizations is to ‘engineer’ hybrid
regimes, such as the ‘despotic democracy’, that Tocqueville feared two
centuries ago. The hybridity of political regimes derives from a ‘circu-
lative’ organization, based on competitive mechanisms, monitored from
the centre by a circle of powerful leaders, shifting groups of experts about
who have to display high degrees of allegiance, even as their project
engagements constantly lead them to both necessarily transgress, while
still having to champion, purely intraorganizational calculations consti-
tuted from within the boundaries, in their everyday traverse of the
margins of their organization.
We have also suggested that, to analyse bureaucratic transformation
and reproduction, one has to abandon ideal types not in favour of a
concern with the respective efficiency of organizational models, but for a
concern with the political stability of business firms. Current bureau-
cracies have little to do with any essential features of the ideal type that
Weber bequeathed to us—as Martindale (1960) says, the destiny of such
models will always end up on the scrapheap. Put another way, organiza-
tions should be seen as political regimes rather more than as functionally
efficient arrangements. When scholars grapple with the demise or refur-
bishment of bureaucracy, the central icon of organization studies, its
essential abstract concept and ideal type, they should recall the opposi-
tion between democracy and despotism in Tocquevillean terms, or
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between closed hegemonies and polyarchies in Dahl’s terms (1971: 7).
What differentiates concrete instances of bureaucracy is its capacity to
adapt to different kinds of political regimes. Behind the scenes, olig-
archies perpetuate themselves as the major regime of power distribution.
Gouldner was thus right in dealing with the question of the political
background instead of accumulating invariably controversial evidence on
the comparative efficiency of alternative models. We would do well to
remember his unique contributions to the corpus of knowledge.
The evolution of democratic systems towards ‘mild despotic’ regimes
is at the very heart of the post-bureaucratic critique. Its importance has to
be addressed to illuminate how far soft bureaucracy can be a political and
organizational form serving as a functional and moral compromise
between apparently opposite political regimes. Ultimately, we must ask
whether the continued power of actual bureaucracies is due to the
unexpected validity of contested oligarchies (Courpasson, 2004) or
because of ‘competitive oligarchies’ (Dahl, 1971) serving as central polit-
ical regimes in the contemporary business world?
Note
We appreciate the very helpful comments of the Organization reviewers
on earlier drafts of this paper.
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